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TAKINGS AND STATUTORY ENTITLEMENTS:
DOES THE TOBACCO BUYOUT TAKE QUOTA
RIGHTS WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION?
MATTHEW NIS LEERBERG
INTRODUCTION
Several of the prominent domestically grown crops are or have
1
been grown under a government-imposed quota system. Under such
a system, Congress creates quota rights that are distributed to
farmers, providing them with the exclusive right to produce the crop.2
In the global economy, however, such regulated markets have led to
3
ever-decreasing demand for expensive domestic crops. Instead,
manufacturers buy the crops from foreign producers at significant
4
price savings. Because the quota holders’ property interests are
calculated as percentages of the domestic crop output, the property
interests become less valuable as a result, which in turn increases the
cost of farming domestically.5

Copyright © 2006 by Matthew Nis Leerberg.
1. E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1316 (2000) (repealed 2004) (tobacco); §§ 1321–1330 (2000)
(corn); §§ 1331–1340 (2000) (wheat); §§ 1341–1350 (2000) (cotton); §§ 1351–1356 (2000) (rice);
§§ 1357–1359a (2000) (peanuts).
2. See, e.g., § 1313(a) (2000) (repealed 2004).
3. The Necessity of a Tobacco Quota Buyout: Why It Is Crucial to Rural Communities and
the U.S. Tobacco Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Production and Price
Competitiveness of the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 108th Cong. 9 (2004)
[hereinafter Necessity] (statement of Larry Wooten, president, North Carolina Farm Bureau).
4. See Thomas C. Capehart, Jr., U.S. Tobacco Industry Responding to New Competitors,
New Challenges, AMBER WAVES, Sept. 2003, http://www.ers.usda.gov/amberwaves/
september03/features/ustobaccoindustry.htm (“With cheaper tobacco available on the world
market, U.S. tobacco is losing global and domestic market share.”).
5. Id. Beyond economic concerns, the legality of the U.S. quota and price-support system
has been questioned, increasing the uncertainty faced by quota holders. See Danny McKinney,
Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, Season of Change, http://www.burley
tobacco.com/Default.aspx?tabid=27&mid=399&ctl=Details&ItemID=101 (last visited Feb. 2,
2006) (noting that the World Trade Organization in 2004 was preparing to evaluate the legality
of the U.S. quota and price support system).
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Recent changes to tobacco law illustrate the rising inefficacy of
quota systems and problems arising from their dissolution. With the
passing of the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004
6
(FETRA, more commonly referred to as the Buyout) as part of the
7
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, tobacco became the first
American crop to move instantaneously from a government8
regulated market to a free-market system. Thus, tobacco presents a
ready case study in whether the elimination of a regulatory quota
system constitutes a compensable taking.
The market for domestically grown tobacco had contracted by
half from 1998 to 2004.9 As a result, the amount of tobacco that a
quota holder may produce has similarly decreased by over 50
10
percent. Moreover, the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA)11 in 1998 between tobacco manufacturers and several states
12
has led to an increase in the cost of producing tobacco.
Not surprisingly, tobacco quota holders and their representatives
have been clamoring for years for buyout legislation that would
eliminate the crippled quota system while justly compensating quota
13
holders for their property interest in the quota rights. Quota holders
14
have witnessed several failed attempts at passing such a buyout.

6. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 601–643, 118 Stat. 1418, 1521–36 (2004). This Note will use
“FETRA” to refer to the act itself, and “the Buyout” to refer to the program as a whole.
7. Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. at 1418.
8. Kelly Tiller, Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, The U.S. Tobacco Buyout, at slide 2
(Nov. 1, 2004), http://agpolicy.org/tobuy/ITGA-Tiller-US_Tobacco_Buyout-1Nov2004.ppt.
Although peanut quotas were eliminated by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002, former peanut producers remain eligible for other types of support and tariffs. Pub L. No.
107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002); see Capehart, supra note 4 (noting that unlike tobacco producers,
former peanut producers “may also be eligible for other types of support (such as direct
payments, marketing assistance loans, counter-cyclical payments) and are protected by high
import tariffs”).
9. See Tiller, supra note 8, at slide 7 (demonstrating graphically that the total flue-cured
and burley quotas fell from 1.7 billion pounds per year in 1998 to 0.8 billion pounds per year in
2004).
10. Id. at slide 6–7; Necessity, supra note 3, at 47 (testimony of D. Keith Parrish, CEO,
National Tobacco Growers Association).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. One community leader noted, “For nearly every grower, the 2004 crop will be the
smallest ever produced. Yet, the 2004 crop will be the most expensive I have ever grown on my
farm.” Necessity, supra note 3, at 12 (statement of Sam Crews, president, North Carolina
Tobacco Growers Association).
13. Quota holders and their representatives believe that the elimination of the quota
system without just compensation would indeed effect a taking. See, e.g., The Tobacco Quota
Buyout: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Agric., 108th Cong. 4 (2003) [hereinafter Quota]
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Although the Buyout at least partially has compensated quota
holders for their rights to grow tobacco, it also represents a sudden
shift to financial independence for those who were formerly reliant on
such rights for their livelihood. Indeed, many tobacco quota holders
are elderly persons relying on the stream of income from leasing the
quota right to tobacco farmers.15 Thus, the question of whether the
Buyout represents a taking without just compensation is far from
abstract for those persons relying on quota leases as their primary
source of income.
The Buyout represents the most drastic change in American
tobacco policy since 1938.16 This Note will first describe the history of
tobacco quotas in the United States, from 1938 to present. Then, this
Note will develop the current structure of takings doctrine. Applying
this doctrine to the Buyout, this Note will show that the Buyout
changes the tobacco landscape in such a way as to constitute a
compensable taking.17 Additionally, this Note will show that the
Buyout payments are only partial compensation18 and do not rise to
19
the level of “just compensation” required by the Fifth Amendment.

(statement of Rep. William L. Jenkins (Tennessee)) (“I hope that at the end of this process,
those with property rights can receive the compensation to which they are entitled.”); id. at 15
(statement of John William Carter III, owner and operator, Carter Farms) (“We must find a
way to compensate current quota owners for their production rights.”); id. at 18 (statement of
Donald L. Moore, owner and operator, Moore Farms) (“I don’t believe it is right to take it away
without compensation.”).
14. The first serious legislative proposals were introduced concurrently with the litigation
leading to the MSA. E.g., Tobacco Transition Act, S. 1313, 105th Cong. (1997) (offering Buyout
payments to quota holders in exchange for relinquishment of all quota rights); Tobacco Market
Transition Act, H.R. 3437, 105th Cong. (1998) (eliminating the quota system while making
compensation payments to eligible quota holders). Several other bills followed but were
similarly unenacted. E.g., Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2002, H.R. 5035, 107th Cong.
(2002) (same); Tobacco Equity Elimination Act of 2003, H.R. 245, 108th Cong. (2003) (same);
Tobacco Market Transition Act of 2003, S. 1490, 108th Cong. (2003) (same).
15. See, e.g., Quota, supra note 13, at 18 (statement of Donald L. Moore, owner and
operator, Moore Farms) (“Over half of the quota I produce is rented from primarily retired
farmers or widowed farm wives who consider this quota a retirement asset.”).
16. Tiller, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that the Agricultural Adjustment Act, enacted in 1938,
marked the genesis of the tobacco quota system); see infra text accompanying notes 25–26.
17. See infra Part 057 Tw5021.4925 0 TD0.007 Tw[(1)-14.40.0(4.40.0(g(.)-.1(e)-11.1(d)0.2( the ge)-11.1(n)15.1(e)-11.1(si)-9.2(s)12.3(
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I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF TOBACCO QUOTAS
The tobacco-growing industry is one of the largest of all crop
industries in the United States.20 In several states, such as Kentucky
and North Carolina, tobacco is the most significant crop in the state
economy.21 There are two primary types of tobacco, together
constituting about 94 percent of U.S. tobacco production: flue-cured
22
and burley. North Carolina specializes in flue-cured, whereas
Kentucky specializes in burley.23
A. The Origins of the Tobacco Quota System
24

As part of the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA), the
federal government instituted a price support and marketing quota
25
system. The tobacco quota system was created to protect farmers
26
from “uncontrollable natural causes” that affected their operations.
Congress deemed it an appropriate industry for federal intervention
because tobacco farmers “[were] not so situated as to be able to
organize effectively, as [could] labor and industry through unions and
corporations enjoying Government protection and sanction.”27
Ultimately, the AAA established a quota system to combat the lack
of “orderly marketing” of tobacco, which had resulted in the
production of “abnormally excessive supplies” of tobacco that were
“dumped indiscriminately on the Nation-wide market.”28 The
overabundant supply led to a significant reduction in the price of
29
tobacco.

20. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 6–7 tbl.1 (2002) (Historical
Highlights: 2002 & Earlier Census Years), http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/
volume1/us/st99_1_001_001.pdf.
21. See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 241 tbl.1 (2002) (State
Summary Highlights: 2002), http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/us/st99_
2_001_001.pdf (showing that in North Carolina, for example, more pounds of tobacco (353
million) were produced than any other crop in 2002).
22. JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TOBACCO PRICE SUPPORT: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM 1 (2004), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/
CRSreports/04Jun/95-129.pdf.
23. Id. at 2.
24. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281–1521 (2000).
25. Id. This Note deals exclusively with the tobacco quota system, id. §§ 1311–1316
(repealed 2004), and not the tobacco price support system, id. § 1445 (repealed 2004).
26. Id. § 1311 (repealed 2004).
27. Id. § 1311(a) (repealed 2004).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 1311(b) (repealed 2004).

04__LEERBERG.DOC

2006]

8/22/2006 9:11 AM

TAKINGS & QUOTAS

869

Under the tobacco quota system, the federal government initially
30
disseminated production rights to tobacco-growing states, which in
turn distributed the rights to particular farmers.31 The quota rights
were attached to certain parcels of land but could be traded within
32
geographic constraints specified by regulation.
Pursuant to the AAA, it was illegal to farm and sell tobacco
without first holding a property interest in corresponding quota
33
rights. Thus, a significant secondary market emerged in tobacco
34
35
quota rights. Such rights could be leased, for example. This
secondary market concentrated actual tobacco growing in far fewer
persons than those who held quota rights;36 it also artificially inflated
the cost of producing tobacco because most growers leased their
37
quota rights at a substantial cost.
Importantly, the quota rights did not convey the privilege to
produce a particular amount of tobacco per year. Instead, the
secretary of agriculture each year established the amount of tobacco
of each type that would be grown in the United States, in light of the
projected demands of the major tobacco companies. Thus, the quota
rights represented the right to produce a certain proportion of the
38
secretary’s prescribed yearly total.

30. Id. § 1313(a) (repealed 2004).
31. Id. § 1313(b), (c) (repealed 2004).
32. Id. § 1316 (repealed 2004).
33. See id. § 1314(a) (repealed 2004) (“The marketing of . . . any kind of tobacco in excess
of the marketing quota for the farm on which the tobacco is produced . . . shall be subject to a
penalty of 75 per centum of the average market price . . . .”); see also State v. Philip Morris USA
Inc., No. 98 CVS 14377, 2004 WL 2966013, at *4 (N.C. Super. Dec. 23, 2004) (“[T]he only way a
producer of tobacco can sell his or her product in the United States is to own or lease quota
from a quota owner.”).
34. Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *4.
35. See Quota, supra note 13, at 12 (statement of Jeff Aiken, owner and operator, Carter
Farms).
36. See Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *4 (noting that in 2002 there were nearly four
times as many tobacco quota holders as tobacco growers).
37. See id. (“It is clear then that part of the cost of [tobacco] leaf was for leasing quota, a
wholly artificial cost created by the federal statutory scheme.”); Quota, supra note 13, at 12–13
(statement of Jeff Aiken, owner and operator, Carter Farms) (“[T]here is another major nonvalue-added expense I have to pay, the cost of acquiring quota to maintain sufficient levels of
production to sustain my farming operation.”).
38. To make this distinction clearer, suppose the secretary has determined that Ft pounds
of flue-cured tobacco may be produced for year t. A given quota holder might hold the rights to
a proportion P of the secretary’s total. Thus, the quota holder’s property interest in year t is
equal to P × Ft pounds of tobacco. Note, however, that the quota holder’s property interest in
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B. The Need for a Buyout
On November 23, 1998, the five largest tobacco companies (the
39
Settling Companies) signed an agreement with representatives of
forty-six states (the Settling States and, together with the Settling
Companies, the Settling Parties), ending litigation in various stages
40
that had been winding through the judicial system across the nation.
41
In order to pay for the MSA, the Settling Companies immediately
raised the price of a pack of cigarettes by forty-five cents.42
Realizing that the increased price of cigarettes would likely lead
to reduced demand and thus reduced revenue for tobacco farmers,
the Settling Parties agreed that the Settling Companies would make
certain payments (Phase II payments)43 to farmers on a quarterly
basis until 2010.44 The Phase II payments are intended to compensate
the farmers for the economic losses incurred as a result of the MSA
and subsequent price increases.
The subsequent decline in demand for domestic tobacco,
however, has escalated beyond that envisioned by the Settling
45
Parties. For example, in North Carolina, “farm receipts from
tobacco sales [in 2003] were less than $600,000,000, a decline of over

year t+1, namely, P × Ft+1, might be equivalent to a greater or lesser number of pounds of
tobacco than in year t.
39. The Settling Companies were Brown & Williamson Tobacco, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Philip Morris, Incorporated, Commonwealth Tobacco
and Liggett & Meyers. JOY JOHNSON WILSON, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS,
SUMMARY OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL MASTER TOBACCO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
(1999), http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/tobacco/summary.htm#Preface (last visited
Feb. 3, 2006). The first two companies have since merged, forming Reynolds American Inc.
News Release, RJR Shareholders Approve Proposed Combination of Reynolds Tobacco and
Brown & Williamson, July 28, 2004, http://www.reynoldsamerican.com/News/ViewRelease.asp?
docID=955.
40. Wilson, supra note 39.
41. Over the twenty-five years spanning 1998 to 2023, the Settling Companies will make
certain payments, known as the Phase I payments, to the Settling States totaling $206 billion.
Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *7.
42. Capehart, supra note 4.
43. Contrast these Phase II payments, made to farmers, with the Phase I payments, made
to the Settling States. Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *7.
44. Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *3.
45. See Necessity, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Larry Wooten, president, North Carolina
Farm Bureau) (noting that the regulated market was “never designed to withstand the
consequences of the Master Settlement Agreement”).
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46
$500,000,000 as compared to 1997.” One cause of this decline is the
continued availability of cheap foreign-grown tobacco.47 The secretary
has reduced the amount of tobacco that may be produced nearly
48
every year since 1998. In fact, the projected cut for 2005, had buyout
legislation not been enacted, was 30 percent.49 Facing a decline in the
poundage associated with their quota property interest, quota holders
had, since 1998, begun increasing the prices at which they were willing
to lease their quota rights.50 This is perhaps due in part to the fact that
in many cases, tobacco quota holders are elderly persons relying on
51
the quota leases to maintain a constant income stream.
The two largest tobacco-producing states, North Carolina and
52
Kentucky, have been hardest hit by the decline in demand. In such
tobacco-reliant states, the decline has had a “ripple effect” in related
industries, including those of farm equipment and pesticides.53
In light of the decreasing demand for domestic tobacco, the
eventual cessation of Phase II payments, and the threat of economic
peril, tobacco growers and quota holders have been lobbying for the
quota system to be discontinued by way of a buyout for many years.54
Finally, in 2004, Congress enacted FETRA to address quota holders’
55
concerns.

C. FETRA
FETRA provides for an end to the tobacco quota system as well
as an end to the price support program in favor of a free-market

46. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Elizabeth Dole (North Carolina)). More dramatically, the
quotas for burley tobacco were reduced by 45 percent in one year, 2000. Philip Morris, 2004 WL
2966013, at *5.
47. Capehart, supra note 4.
48. See Tiller, supra note 8, at 7 (numerically demonstrating the steady quota decline).
49. Necessity, supra note 3, at 8 (statement of Larry Wooten, president, North Carolina
Farm Bureau).
50. Capehart, supra note 4.
51. See Quota, supra note 13, at 18 (statement of Donald L. Moore, owner and operator,
Moore Farms) (“Over half of the quota I produce is rented from primarily retired farmers or
widowed farm wives who consider this quota a retirement asset.”).
52. See Necessity, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Sen. Elizabeth Dole (North Carolina))
(noting that this decline “equates to a $1.1 billion hit on North Carolina’s economy at current
quota levels”).
53. Id.
54. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
55. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 601–643, 118 Stat. 1418, 1521–36 (2004).
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56
system. Under FETRA and its elimination of the tobacco quota
system, most observers expect there to be “a decrease in the cost of
production (leasing costs being eliminated) and an increase in the
amount produced in the United States (restrictions on production
being eliminated), combined with a reduction in the price paid for”
tobacco by the tobacco companies.57 Considering these factors,
Congress provided that the dissolution of the quota system would be
associated with a buyout of the quota holders’ and tobacco growers’
property interest (the Buyout Payments).58
The Buyout Payments for quota holders consist of $7.00 per
pound of quota owned as of 2002, to be paid in equal installments
from 2005 through 2014.59 The Buyout Payments are estimated to cost
the government approximately $9.6 billion over ten years.60 Not all of
this money constitutes a net gain for tobacco farmers and quota
holders. The Buyout triggers a clause in the MSA that ends the Phase
II payments to farmers from the Settling Companies.61
The Buyout Payments are “offered” to the tobacco quota
62
holders. Although this might imply that quota holders have an
option to reject the Buyout Payments, thereby obviating a takings
claim by giving a quota holder a choice, FETRA negates the value of
the quota rights regardless of whether the “offer” is accepted.63 Thus,
a tobacco quota holder has little incentive to reject the Buyout
64
Payments.

56. Id. §§ 611–612, 118 Stat. at 1522–24.
57. State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 98 CVS 14377, 2004 WL 2966013, at *4 (N.C.
Super. 2004).
58. Pub. L. No. 108-357, §§ 622–623, 118 Stat. 1418, 1525–28 (2004).
59. Id. § 622(e), 118 Stat. at 1526–27.
60. Necessity, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Hon. Richard Burr, Rep. of North Carolina).
61. Philip Morris, 2004 WL 2966013, at *11. Whether Phase II payments are to be
terminated at the beginning of 2004, after the third quarter of 2004, or after the fourth quarter
of 2004 is the subject of present litigation before the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id.
62. As the statute indicates:
CONTRACT OFFERED.—The Secretary shall offer to enter into a contract with
each tobacco quota holder under which the tobacco quota holder shall be entitled to
receive payments under this section in exchange for the termination of tobacco
marketing quotas and related price support under the amendments made by sections
611 and 612. The contract payments shall constitute full and fair consideration for the
termination of such tobacco marketing quotas and related price support.
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 622(a), 118 Stat. at 1525.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Because farmers will begin competing directly with foreign
growers, many farmers are likely to abandon the growing of tobacco,
and many quota holders are left with no other means of income but
65
the Buyout Payments. Therefore, it remains critical that the Buyout
Payments constitute “just compensation” if FETRA effects a taking
of the quota holders’ property interest in their quota.
II. TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, “[N]or
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”66 The “aim of the Clause is to prevent the
government ‘from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.’”67 Nevertheless, “a party challenging governmental action as
an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden” in proving that
68
the taking is unconstitutional. A takings analysis begins by first
identifying the property or property interest allegedly taken,69
65. Quota, supra note 13, at 18 (statement of Donald L. Moore, owner and operator,
Moore Farms).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (quoting Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
68. Id. at 523.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1192–93 (1967) (insisting that the “particular thing” allegedly taken must be defined before
takings analysis may proceed).
Notably, a takings claim alleging a physical occupation or exercise of eminent domain, see
infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text, requires a showing that the taking was for a “public
use.” See Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (“[O]ne person’s
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid.”). Nevertheless, this “public use” requirement has
been broadly construed. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (“The
‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.”).
Thus, the Court has held that even a state-sponsored real property redistribution scheme
constituted a “public use.” Id. at 241–42; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655,
2668 (2005) (finding potential economic development to be a satisfactory public purpose).
In the case of regulatory takings, however, “a public use has [never] been a necessary
component.” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326 (2002). Therefore, a government need not demonstrate as a threshold matter that its actions
serve a public purpose. The existence of a public or private use has no bearing on the finding of
a regulatory taking.
Note also that state action must be shown before a takings claim will lie. Barron v. City of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833). Moreover, the Takings Clause does not in itself protect
private property interests from actions by state governments. Id. Nevertheless, the Takings
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proceeds by determining whether such interest was actually taken,
and if it was, finally concludes by assessing whether just compensation
was provided.
At the outset, it would appear that there are two ways to
incorporate the “taking” and “just compensation” elements of the
Takings Clause. In the first method, a court ignores any proffered
compensation, determines whether the property interest has been
taken, and only then considers whether the proffered compensation is
sufficiently “just.” In the second method, a court weighs any
proffered compensation as a retained interest in the property
allegedly taken.
Consider the following hypothetical. Suppose a property owner
has a property interest, the value of which is $100,000. Imagine that
the government is about to pass a regulation that would reduce the
fair market value of the property to a mere $20,000. An organization
representing the interests of the property owner and those similarly
situated then successfully lobbies to attach a provision that provides
partial compensation of $30,000 to the property owner.
Under the first method (ignoring proffered compensation
initially), the $30,000 is inapposite to the question of whether a taking
has occurred. Such a regulation may constitute a taking that requires
just compensation.71 If so, the government must compensate the
property owner in the amount of $80,000.72 Thus, a court would find
that the provision of $30,000 is not “just” in light of the proper
compensation due of $80,000. The court would levy a judgment
against the government in the amount of $50,000.73
Alternatively, consider an analytical method whereby the actual
compensation given, if any, is considered as part of the takings
analysis. Under this approach, the $30,000 paid to the property owner
concurrently with the passage of the statute would be added to the
$20,000 of in-kind value remaining in the property interest. Then, a

Clause is considered incorporated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus applies to the States. Chi., B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 232 (1897). In the case of the buyout of tobacco quota holders, the enactment of FETRA is
sufficient to meet the state action requirement.
70. See infra Part II.B.
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. See infra Part II.C.
73. That is, the property would have been reduced in value from $100,000 to $20,000, or
$80,000. Because the provision of $30,000 is less than the $80,000, the government would still
owe $80,000 less $30,000 or $50,000 to the property owner.
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court would decide if the regulation, which deprived the property
owner of only 50 percent (versus 80 percent under standard takings
analysis) of the property value, constitutes a taking. Notably, the
balancing test often used to determine whether an action constitutes a
taking does not establish a bright line beyond which a taking must be
found.74 Thus, a court might find that no taking occurred.75
The Court has embraced the first method, ignoring proffered
compensation until a taking is found: the compensation, if any,
provided by the government is considered only as part of the just
compensation question.76 The question, therefore, remains what
precisely constitutes a taking. The Court has identified at least three
distinct categories of takings, which are regulatory takings, eminent
domain, and physical occupation.77 This Note will focus on applying

74. See infra Part II.B.2.
75. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule . . . is that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”).
To be more precise, suppose a property owner holds a property interest worth Vi before
the passing of the regulation, which is worth only Vt afterwards, and the government offers
partial compensation, Cp. Further suppose that, in light of all of the facts and circumstances of
the case, a taking will be found if the property owner realizes an economic loss of Lt (a positive
number). Finally, let the just compensation due if a taking is found be Cj.
Then, under a takings analysis in which the just compensation question is analytically
distinct from the takings question, a taking will be found when Vi – Vt > Lt, and the just
compensation due can be defined by the formula, Cj = Vi – Vt – Cp. If, however, Vi – Vt < Lt, no
taking will be found, and no additional compensation will be due.
Conversely, under the alternative method, in which the just compensation question is
conflated with the takings question, a taking will be found when Vi – Vt > Lt + Cp, and the just
compensation due can again be defined by the formula given above.
Thus, the significance of the difference in analytic method is not in the extreme cases,
when both methods find a taking or both find no taking. Instead, in the realm where Lt + Cp > Vi
– Vt > Lt, as in the example above, the difference in analytic method means the difference
between a taking being found and compensated at Cj = Vi – Vt – Lt – Cp, and no taking being
found. Under the alternative method, the government could use partial compensation to avoid
ever having to pay just compensation, provided that it accurately selected the value of Cp such
that Vi – Vt < Lt + Cp.
76. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350 (1986) (“[A]
court cannot determine whether a municipality has failed to provide ‘just compensation’ until it
knows what, if any, compensation the responsible administrative body intends to provide.”). But
see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) (holding that certain
partial compensation rights “nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the
law has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering
the impact of regulation”). For further application of this critical distinction in light of the
Buyout, see infra Part III.C.
77. Stuart Miller, Triple Ways to Take: The Evolution and Meaning of the Supreme Court’s
Three Regulatory Taking Standards, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 243, 245 (1998).
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the “famously incoherent” regulatory takings analysis to the Buyout.
Discussion of the other two categories, eminent domain and physical
occupation,79 are inapposite to a takings analysis of the Buyout, and
are thus beyond the scope of this Note.
A. Identifying the Property Interest
Notably, the property interest of quota rights is not an interest in
land or tangible property. The Court has exhibited a willingness,
however, to extend takings protection to any property interest, not
80
merely those that may be physically taken. Even so, defining a
property interest’s “functional dimension,”81 that is, identifying the
property interest in question among the various rights a property
owner may possess, is only the first step in delineating the precise
property interest alleged to be taken.82 Although the functional
dimension of a particular property interest has been identified, the
specific property interest allegedly taken must be defined, both
temporally and spatially, before proceeding to determine whether just
83
compensation was provided.
As recently explained by the Supreme Court:
Property interests may have many different dimensions. For
example, the dimensions of a property interest may include a
physical dimension (which describes the size and shape of the
property in question), a functional dimension (which describes the
extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the property in

78. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 1–2 (2003).
79. Miller, supra note 77, at 245.
80. Property interests are not confined in the “vulgar and untechnical [sic] sense [to] the
physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law.” United
States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945). Instead, in the context of takings analysis,
property interests include “every sort of interest the citizen may possess.” Id. at 378. This
expansive definition of “property” has been limited, however, to exclude abstract economic
interests unless “they are legally protected interests.” United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
324 U.S. 499, 503 (1945).
81. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 774
(9th Cir. 2000) (defining “functional dimension” as “the extent to which an owner may use or
dispose of the property in question”), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
82. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (identifying
the precise property interest at issue, namely, the airspace above New York’s Grand Central
Station before proceeding with the takings analysis).
83. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318.
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question), and a temporal dimension (which describes the duration
84
of the property interest).

Because it is often critical in a takings analysis to “compare the
value that has been taken from the property with the value that
85
remains in the property,” the question arises as to “whose value is to
furnish the denominator of the fraction.”86 That is, to determine the
extent of a reduction in value of a property interest, one must first
decide the bounds of the property interest being taken. The
significance of selecting the “denominator” cannot be overstated
because “[t]o the extent that any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety.”87 The Court, however, has
“consistently rejected . . . an approach to the ‘denominator’ question”
that establishes the denominator to be precisely the size or duration
that was taken.88
Instead, the physical dimension of the property interest must be
considered to be coterminous with the boundaries of the functional
89
property interest in question. Thus, when the Court considered
84. Id. (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 774); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROPERTY §§ 7–9 (1936) (defining various property estates in terms of such dimensions).
85. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
86. Id. (citing Michelman, supra note 69, at 1192). To illustrate, suppose that a quota
holder has a certain allotment to grow flue-cured tobacco, and a certain allotment to grow
burley tobacco. If a new regulation deprives the quota holder of all value of the flue-cured
quota, but does not affect the burley quota, then the “denominator question” asks whether to
consider only the flue-cured quota or the overall quota in determining if a taking has occurred.
Defining the “denominator” as just flue-cured would mean that the quota holder was left with
the fraction 0 / flue-cured quota, or zero. Defining the denominator instead as both flue-cured
and burley would mean that the quota holder was left with burley quota / (flue-cured + burley
quota), or a figure larger than zero.
87. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 644 (1993).
88. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1016 n.7 (1992) (“[I]t is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract,
or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.”).
Fortunately for parsimony, this dictum has not modified lower courts’ rejection of conceptual
severance. E.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 238–40
(1996); Bauer v. Waste Mgmt. of Conn., Inc., 662 A.2d 1179, 1196 (Conn. 1995). The Court itself
has since retreated from such stringent conceptual severance. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 630–31 (2001) (considering the affected wetlands property in light of the claimants
entire land interest, including the portion that remained developable after the regulation).
89. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978) (“‘Taking’
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated . . . . [The] Court focuses . . .
on . . . the parcel as a whole.”).
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whether a New York City regulation depriving the owners of Grand
Central Station of their right to develop the airspace above the
terminal was an unjust taking, it defined the physical dimension of the
property interest as “the parcel as a whole,” extending above and
90
below the ground in accordance with title and state law.
91
Similarly, the temporal dimension of the property interest must
be considered to be coterminous with the boundaries of the
92
functional property interest in question. Thus, for example, a fee
93
simple estate has an indefinite temporal dimension, whereas a life
estate would have a temporal dimension coincident with the lifetime
of the life-estate holder.94 Similarly, a moratorium on the
development of a particular parcel of land for a thirty-two-month
period does not constitute a taking of the owner’s entire property
interest.95
B. Determining Whether a Taking Has Occurred
Although the rules for delineating the dimensions of the
property interest in question appear to be fairly well settled after
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
96
Agency, the rules for determining whether a taking has occurred
remain “a problem of considerable difficulty.”97 The takings issue has
been called “[b]y far the most intractable constitutional property

90. See id. at 130–31 (“In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block
designated as the ‘landmark site.’”).
91. Defining the temporal dimension of the property interest includes assessing the
duration or longevity of the interest and affixing the point in time at which to value the interest.
92. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332 (“[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of
the entire area is a taking of ‘the parcel as a whole,’ whereas a temporary restriction that merely
causes a diminution in value is not.”).
93. See, e.g., id. (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the
prohibition is lifted.”).
94. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 117 (1936).
95. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332. Nevertheless, such interference may yet constitute a
taking if it “goes too far.” Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For a discussion of
the “too far” test, as well as the situations in which a per se taking may be found, see infra Part
II.B.2.
96. 535 U.S. 302, 318 (2002).
97. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
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98
issue.” As one commentator observes, “[T]akings doctrine is a
mess.”99
As a threshold matter, regulatory takings analysis does not
measure what is gained by the government, but rather, what is lost by
100
the property owner. Nevertheless, three separate standards have
101
been developed by the Court to analyze regulatory takings claims.
One of the three, the “essential nexus” test, has recently been limited
to cases involving exactions and is thus irrelevant to the Buyout
context.102 Each of the other two standards presents a sufficient basis
for a regulatory takings claim, and thus both should be evaluated in a
given case.103 The first test entails a categorical standard by which a
per se taking occurs. The second test involves a balancing of the facts
and circumstances of a given case. Each of these two standards will be
examined in turn.

1. The Categorical Standard. Throughout the history of the
takings doctrine, a categorical standard by which a per se taking may
be found has evolved.104 The essence of the modern categorical

98. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 n.2
(1993) (citing some of the more colorful descriptions of the confused state of takings
jurisprudence).
99. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 279
(1992).
100. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (“[T]he deprivation of
the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the
taking.”).
101. Miller, supra note 77, at 245; see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014, 1016, 1019 (1992) (recognizing that a taking may occur by lack of an adequate state
interest, by a categorical rule, and by a balancing test); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485, 492 (1987) (same).
102. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2086 (2005).
103. Miller, supra note 77, at 245. Of course, in certain cases one or more of the three
categories will merit little discussion. For example, the categorical rules may be clearly
inapposite to the analysis of a particular case.
104. Miller, supra note 77, at 287. One of the early manifestations of a categorical standard
arose in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Under Hadacheck, a use may be
prohibited entirely without triggering the need for compensation if the prohibited use
constitutes a public nuisance. Id. at 408. Elimination of the tobacco quota system, however, does
not curb a public nuisance. Smoking tobacco may indeed constitute a public nuisance in certain
circumstances, see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.6-2(a) (2001) (“Smoking tobacco in any form is
a public nuisance and dangerous to public health . . . .”), repealed by Public Health and
Workplace Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 2004, ch. 198, § 1. Here, however, the productive use of a
quota property interest, namely, growing tobacco (or leasing property for tobacco growing), is
not likely to create a public nuisance.
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standard—as developed in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
105
Council —is that a regulatory taking of all of the economic value of
a property interest must be compensated.106 The categorical standard
107
embraced by Lucas is difficult to meet, however. For example, even
a reduction in value from $3,150,000 to $200,000 has been held not to
constitute a taking of all of the economic value of the property.108 As a
109
result, much scholarly criticism has been levied against Lucas.
110
Nevertheless, Lucas remains controlling authority.
2. The Balancing Standard. Absent a categorical taking,111 most
regulatory claims are “a question of degree—and therefore cannot be
112
disposed of by general propositions.” Thus, there is no “set formula
113
to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.”

105. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
106. Id. at 1027. When undertaking a takings analysis, it is critical to first define the
functional, spatial, and temporal dimensions of the property interest in question. See supra Part
II.A. Otherwise, any regulatory taking could meet the categorical standard of some property
interest. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
107. 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court imagines that [the categorical
standard] will arise ‘relatively rarely’ or only in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”).
108. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–31 (2001) (holding that a regulation
precluding the development of a seventy-four-lot subdivision on a particular plot did not
constitute a “total taking” because the property owner could still “build a substantial residence”
on the parcel).
109. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1993) (“The Supreme Court’s inability to
understand the role of reasonable expectations in generating entitlements paves the way for the
rapid elimination of all perceived entitlements by simply claiming that the enactment of a single
government regulation reasonably creates an expectation that further regulations will follow.”);
Donald Large, Lucas: A Flawed Attempt to Redefine the Mahon Analysis, 23 ENVTL. L. 883, 886
(1993) (“The primary flaw I see in the majority’s opinion is that having established the principle
that you have to pay the land owner for a total wipe-out of value, and having eliminated the
‘noxious use’ exception to the principle, they dragged the exception right back in again.”);
Laura McKnight, Regulatory Takings: Sorting Out Supreme Court Standards After Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 615, 615 (1993) (“Unfortunately, the Court
in Lucas did not pin down a standard that eliminates the confusion regarding regulatory
takings.”).
110. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630–32 (applying the categorical standard from Lucas to the
facts before the Court).
111. See supra Part II.B.1.
112. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
113. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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Certainly, not every regulatory action by a state should result in a
114
On the contrary, the Takings Clause “preserves
taking.
governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of
115
‘justice and fairness.’” Unfortunately, the Court has “been unable to
develop any set formula for determining when justice and fairness
require that economic injuries caused by public action be
116
compensated by the government.” Thus, “[t]he inquiry into whether
a taking has occurred is essentially an ‘ad hoc, factual’ inquiry.”117
Instead, a balancing standard controls, by which a regulatory
taking occurs when a regulation “goes too far” to limit the property
118
interest in question. In “certain circumstances . . . a particular
exercise of the State’s regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous
119
as to compel compensation.” Of course, under such a standard,
“[t]here is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention
120
under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate.” A court must
“rely ‘as much [on] the exercise of judgment as [on] the application of
logic.’”121
Despite the vagaries of the Court’s approach to the balancing
standard, two factors are of particular significance: (1) “the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant”; and (2) “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.”122 Often, the Court has characterized the second factor

114. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law.”).
115. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
116. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (internal quotations omitted).
117. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
118. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
119. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
120. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65.
121. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 349 (1986) (quoting
Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65).
122. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of NewYork, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Penn Central
actually lists three factors as critical for takings analysis. Id. The third, however, “the character
of the government action,” id., is synonymous with the distinction among eminent domain,
physical occupation, and regulatory action. See, e.g., id. (citing “physical invasion by the
government” as an example of the “character of government action”); Miller, supra note 77, at
248–53 (noting the standards applicable to takings claims for eminent domain and physical
occupation); see also supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
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123
as probative of, or as an example of, the first. Nevertheless, it is
124
helpful to analyze the two factors separately.
The Court first articulated the economic-impact factor in Agins
125
v. City of Tiburon. A regulation effects a taking when it “denies [a
property] owner economically viable use” of property.126 The
economic-impact test relies on an infringement of a property owner’s
127
right to “use” the property. Of course, not every regulation
economically impacting a property owner will constitute a taking.128
Rather, the government may “adjust[] the benefits and burdens of
129
economic life” for property owners.
The Court created the distinct investment-backed expectations
130
test in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
Although the Court did not explicitly define the test in Penn Central,
distinct investment-backed expectations are referred to as “interests
that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of
the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment
purposes.”131 As an example, the Court cited Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

123. See, e.g., Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (“The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.”); cf. Michelman, supra
note 69, at 1229–34 (considering the distinct investment-backed-expectations test as part of an
analysis of the economic-impact test).
124. Several cases list the two tests as separate factors for purposes of a balancing analysis.
E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
125. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
126. Id.
127. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“[T]otal deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.”); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed
Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 119
(1995) (noting in light of Lucas that “the right to ‘use’ property has long been viewed as a
fundamental characteristic of property”).
128. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (holding that government
interference with the ground under respondent’s property, although causing subsidence of the
surface, did not constitute a taking).
129. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
130. Id. The Court sometimes refers to this test as the “reasonable investment-backed
expectations test.” E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 342 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001). Regardless of its
precise form, the shared term “investment-backed expectations” appears to have been coined in
one commentator’s famous work on takings. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1213 (“The
problem, then, is to show that utilitarian property theory, applied with utmost consistency, does
not require payment of compensation in every case of social action which is disappointing to
justified, investment-backed expectations.”).
131. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125.
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132
Mahon, noting that although the claimant had sold the surface
rights of his property, he had “expressly reserved the right to remove
the coal thereunder.”133
Nevertheless, a distinct investment-backed expectation “must be
more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract need.’”134
Moreover, an expectation in the “most profitable use of” a property
135
Instead, there are many distinct
interest is not dispositive.
investment-backed expectations “embodied in the concept of
136
‘property.’” When such expectations are “sufficiently important, the
Government must condemn and pay for” the property interest before
taking it.137
Further, the Court has never explained what is required for an
expectation to be “investment backed.”138 One approach would be to
examine investments forgone by the property owner in order to
initially obtain the property interest alleged to be taken.139 It is not
always possible, however, to identify the initial transaction in which
the property owner obtained the property interest in question. Even
if it were possible, the property owner often did not sacrifice much
value at the time of acquisition, but nevertheless might reasonably

132. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
133. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414).
134. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005–06 (1984) (quoting Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
135. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
136. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting the
widespread “struggle to adequately define this term”). Of course, the term “investment” is not
limited to money proffered by “investors.” Instead, it appears that most expenditures by the
challenging party are considered “investment backed.” See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 611 (2001) (assuming that private purchase of parcel of land is “investment backed”);
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992) (same).
139. Under such an approach, “investment-backed expectations” embody something akin to
the tax concept of “basis.” See 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000) (detailing the tax rules for calculating
basis). Basis is a placeholder for the investment that a property owner originally spent to obtain
the property in question. Id. Typically, “[t]he basis of property [is] the cost of such property.”
Id.
An analogy may also be made to contract law. For example, when the future property
owner enters into an agreement with the government, providing good consideration in exchange
for the creation of a regulatory right, later deregulation might effect a taking. See J. Gregory
Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 862 (1996) (“[T]he regulatory contract represents a meeting of the minds
no more ambiguous than typical commercial contracts between private parties.”).
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140
invest in future growth of the property interest. Instead, the Court
has inquired as to the significance of the property owner’s
expectations relating to the property taken.141
Similarly, the property owner need not show that the challenged
regulation was enacted after the property interest was obtained.142 For
example, when an unconstitutional regulation was passed prior to the
property owner receiving title, the property owner could nevertheless
assert a takings claim in light of the regulation.143
Nevertheless, part of doing “business in [a] regulated field” is
that a property owner “cannot object if the legislative scheme is
buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative
end.”144 Thus, as in the rest of regulatory takings analysis, a court must
examine each case on its own peculiar facts.

C. Just Compensation
Once a court has established that a taking has occurred, the court
then examines whether the government has provided “just
compensation.”145 In most instances, “just compensation” is merely
146
the fair market value of the property interest, or the amount that “a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.”147 The fair market
value “term is ‘not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of

140. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165–69, 180 (holding that the government had to
compensate a property owner for “taking” the right to exclude, even though there was scant
evidence of what consideration had been provided by the property owner to acquire the
property initially).
141. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (considering the right to devise
certain Indian lands as insufficient for a distinct investment-backed expectation when the lands
were held in trust by the government and generally only leased to the property owner).
142. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629–30 (rejecting the argument that regulations cannot be
challenged by those who acquire title to property after such regulations are passed).
143. See id. at 627 (reasoning that otherwise, “[a] State would be allowed, in effect, to put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause and that [f]uture generations, too, have a right to
challenge unreasonable limitations” on property interests).
144. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (citing Fed. Hous. Admin. v. The Darlington, Inc. , 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also supra note 75.
146. E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
147. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973)
(quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1942)); see also James Geoffrey Durham,
Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1285 (1985)
(reiterating this common test).
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148

valuation,’” however. For example, in some instances, the value lost
by the property-interest holder far exceeds the value gained by the
government. In such a case, “[i]t is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s
149
gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken.”
Moreover, “[t]he constitutional requirement of just compensation
derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness
150
as it does from technical concepts of property law.”
The Court has provided conflicting guidance on whether the
taking of a property interest created by government itself may be
considered in just compensation analysis. For example, the Court in
151
United States v. Fuller held that “the Government as condemnor
may not be required to compensate a condemnee for elements of
152
value that the Government has created.” In the same opinion,
however, the Court cautioned that “[w]e do not suggest that such a
153
general principle can be pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion.”
III. APPLYING THE TAKINGS FRAMEWORK TO THE TOBACCO
QUOTA BUYOUT
A. The Quota Holders’ Property Interest
A proper takings analysis begins with identification of the
154
specific property interest allegedly taken. In the case of the tobacco
quota holders, the entire analysis turns on proper identification of the
property interest in question. Here, the property interest is not the
land on which tobacco is farmed; similarly, the property interest is not
the right to produce a defined amount of tobacco per year. Instead,
148. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (quoting United States v. Va. Elec. &
Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961)); cf. Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the
Condemnation of Future Interests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989
B.Y.U. L. REV. 789, 820–21 (arguing that just compensation analysis should consider
“demoralization costs and fiscal illusion”).
149. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (citation omitted).
150. Almota, 409 U.S. at 478 (quoting United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973))
(internal citation omitted).
151. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
152. Id. at 492.
153. Id. In Fuller, landowners claimed that their permits to use nearby government land
should be considered part of the value taken when their land was condemned. They argued that
if sold on the free market, the land would fetch a higher price because of the associated use
permits. Id. at 489. The Court held, however, that the taking of the now-worthless use permits
should not impact the amount of compensation owed the landowners. Id. at 492.
154. See supra Part II.A.
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the property interest taken by FETRA is the right to produce and sell
a certain proportion of the tobacco prescribed by the secretary for a
155
given year.
It remains critical to delineate all dimensions of the property
interest in question.156 In particular, the issue remains of when in time
to affix the value of property interests. Because the property interests
fluctuate in value due to the ever-changing tobacco quota market,
selection of the year in which the property interests will be valued
may be dispositive of the takings analysis.
The Court has never squarely faced a takings claim in such a
157
time-affected case. One natural selection for the time dimension
might be 2004, which would allow an accurate comparison of the
value of the quota-property interests immediately before the
enactment of FETRA158 and immediately afterward (zero). The year
of the MSA and the sudden increase in cigarette prices—1998—might
appear to be an attractive choice also159 because quota holders
experienced a significant decline in the actual poundage of tobacco
160
associated with their quota rights beginning in that year.
Nevertheless, this decline, if attributable to the MSA, is not
attributable to state action, and thus is inapposite to a takings
analysis.161 Moreover, the lease price of the quota rights increased
after the MSA to compensate for this decline.162 Thus, the most logical
163
selection is 2004, just prior to the passage of FETRA.

155. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
156. See supra Part II.A.
157. But see Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
306, 332 (2002) (considering whether temporary moratoria on development are per se takings).
In Tahoe-Sierra, however, the temporal dimension in question was not the selection of a
particular moment in time, but rather how broadly to define the time span for the property
interest to determine whether the moratorium effected a taking of all economic value, as in
Lucas, or (alternately) if the balancing standard of Mahon applied.
158. Since FETRA was signed into law on October 22, 2004, this selection would simply be
the 2004 quota levels.
159. See Capehart, supra note 4 (noting that the amount of compensation due would vary
depending on the selection of “base period,” or time dimension).
160. Tiller, supra note 8, at 7.
161. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
162. See Capehart, supra note 4, at 18 (“As the national quota shrinks . . . , competition for
rental quota further inflates the cost of growing tobacco . . . .”).
163. Cf. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (“[V]alue is to be ascertained as of
the date of taking.”). Notably, the actual point in time chosen by FETRA is the 2002 quota
level; however, the 2002 level was nearly identical to the 2004 level. Tiller, supra note 8, at 7.
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In sum, the property interest taken under FETRA is the quota
holders’ right to produce a certain proportion of the nation’s
domestic-grown tobacco, valued in 2004 prior to the passage of the
buyout legislation.
B. The Taking of the Quota Holders’ Property Interest
Having carefully defined the property interest, the next step in a
takings analysis is to focus on whether such property interest has been
taken. As discussed in detail in Part II.B, two pertinent standards are
164
used to determine whether a taking has occurred: the categorical
and the balancing.165
1. Taking under the Categorical Standard. The Court affirmed
in Lucas that the taking of all economic value of a property interest
166
constitutes a taking. Had the property interest been the land itself,
or the right to produce tobacco, FETRA would not constitute a
taking under Lucas. The value of the quota-property interest in the
FETRA context, however, lies in the exclusive right to produce
tobacco in a regulated market.167 With the elimination of the regulated
market, this interest is worth nothing. Former quota holders and
former non–quota holders are on equal footing post-FETRA with
respect to the production of tobacco because each can participate in
the newly freed tobacco market.168 Therefore, because the quota
holders can no longer extract any value from their extinguished quota
rights, FETRA represents a taking of all economic value of the
property interest and constitutes a categorical taking under Lucas.
2. Taking under the Balancing Standard. Even if a court found
that Lucas was inapplicable here, a taking could still be found under

164. See supra Part II.B.1.
165. See supra Part II.B.2.
166. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992).
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. At least one commentator has argued that the elimination of regulatory price supports
does not form sufficient basis for a takings claim. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 139, at 995–96.
Professors Sidak and Spulber argue that a regulatory contract must first exist before a takings
claim may lie; otherwise, the deregulation is the elimination of “mere statutory gratuities.” Id. at
996. However, Sidak and Spulber’s argument focuses solely on “the jurisprudence of network
industries” and fails to squarely address the takings issue presented by a quota system. Id. at
856.
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169

the balancing standard. A taking may be found under the balancing
standard if either of two “particular[ly] significan[t]” factors weighs
heavily: (1) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation”; or (2) “the
extent to which the regulation . . . interfere[s] with distinct
investment-backed expectations.”170 In the case of the tobacco quota
holders, there is no question of “economic use” that is affected by the
171
regulation in the sense in which such term is used in the case law.
Thus, the critical inquiry is whether FETRA interferes with distinct
investment-backed expectations.
To the extent that distinct investment-backed expectations are
acquired based on an initial bargained-for exchange, quota holders
who have possessed their rights since 1938 might not be able to show
that their expectations are investment backed.172 Such quota holders
gave no consideration for their original quota rights.173 The initial
174
distributions were targeted to those who already farmed tobacco.
Thus, in one respect, farmers merely traded their 1938 market share
for the quota rights. On the other hand, if such an exchange is
considered equitable, then the quota holders arguably regain their
market share after FETRA and are justly compensated anyway.
Regardless, several other considerations make it clear that the
quota holders’ property interest is investment backed. First, present
quota holders who are also growers find themselves with farm
equipment lying idle due to the ever-decreasing demand, with
175
significant debt remaining on such equipment. Such equipment was
purchased with the expectation that their quota rights would continue
176
to be valuable. With the passage of FETRA, many such farmers
have ceased or will soon cease farming, yet these farmers still possess

169. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
170. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
171. This factor has been applied to more concrete property interests, such as the
development of a parcel of land. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
173. See 7 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000) (repealed 2004) (issuing tobacco quotas without requiring
consideration in return).
174. See id. (noting the statute’s application to those who already produced tobacco).
175. See Necessity, supra note 3, at 22 (statement of Todd Haymore, director, Universal Leaf
Tobacco Company) (“You’ve made the capital investments and have the equipment to produce
a crop twice the size you are today . . . .”).
176. See id. (implying that such investments and purchases were made because the farmers
believed they would be profitable).
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177
heavily financed equipment. Further, this idle equipment cannot be
used in the service of any crop but tobacco.178 Moreover, many
present quota holders purchased their rights in the secondary
179
market. Thus, their expectations are surely investment backed,
given that they indeed paid fair consideration for the rights with the
expectation that they would continue to have value. Therefore, under
180
the “‘ad hoc, factual’ inquiry” of the balancing test, a court would
likely find that the dissolution of the quota holders’ investmentbacked property interest constituted a taking.
Thus, certain quota holders may present compelling arguments
that FETRA effected a taking of their property interest under either
the categorical standard or the balancing standard.

C. FETRA Does Not Provide Just Compensation
Having determined that FETRA gives rise to valid takings
claims, the final analytical step is to determine whether FETRA’s
payment provisions constitute just compensation. The Court’s usual
test for just compensation is simply the market value of the property
interest.181 Here, the market value for the quota rights was
182
approximately $3.50 per pound in 1998. Because the quota total
established by the secretary decreased by approximately 50 percent
between 1998 and the last year of the quota program, 2004, a
reasonable price for quota rights in 2004 would be about $7.00 per
pound.183 This figure matches exactly the compensation offered by the
Buyout Payments.
Market value, however, is “not an absolute standard nor an
exclusive method of valuation.”184 In the Buyout context, the

177. See id. at 13 (statement of Sam Crews, president, North Carolina Tobacco Growers
Association) (“Sadly, [many former tobacco farmers] remain indebted and completely out of
the tobacco farming business.”).
178. Id. at 17.
179. See Quota, supra note 13, at 22 (statement of Donald L. Wright, owner and operator,
Wright Farm) (noting that quota property interests have “been bought, sold, inherited, married
and the whole prospect”).
180. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
181. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
182. Quota, supra note 13, at 24 (statement of Donald L. Wright, owner and operator,
Wright Farm).
183. Id. at 25.
184. United States v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961).
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“assessment of market value involves the use of assumptions, which
make it unlikely that the appraisal will reflect true value with
185
nicety.” When legislation affecting an industry is pending, market
value within the industry may be an inadequate measure of
compensation. In the case of tobacco, the turmoil in the years
preceding the passage of FETRA depressed quota prices. Further,
because the market prices for quota rights are the market’s best guess
as to the present value of the right over the lifetime of the quota
system, the very uncertainty in the quota system makes a market
value definition of just compensation inappropriate.
Instead, a shorter time scale should be employed, then
compounded over the projected (pre-FETRA) lifetime of the quota
system. In 2003, the one-year-lease price for quota rights was
186
Much less uncertainty is
approximately $0.60 per pound.
programmed into this figure because quota holders could be more
certain that their quota rights would retain their value for one year
than indefinitely. Thus, a proper valuation of the quota rights would
proceed by compounding the $0.60 per pound price over the
(indefinite) lifetime of the quota rights, discounted to present value.187
At a discount rate of 5 percent, the value of the quota rights is thus
188
$12.60 per pound. From this calculation, whether FETRA’s partial
compensation of $7.00 per pound is “just” is a much closer question.
One might argue that this calculation is flawed because it
compounds the one-year-lease rate of the quota rights indefinitely

185. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
186. Quota, supra note 13, at 24 (statement of Donald L. Wright, owner and operator,
Wright Farm).
187. See id. at 88 (statement of Rep. Ernie Fletcher (Kentucky)) (noting that payment levels
were “the estimated present value of the quota-asset, approximated by compounding the rentalvalue of the quota-right . . . over the lifetime of the quota”). The one-year-lease price is also
appropriate because it responds to the prices in the global market for tobacco. That is, the
domestic market for a quota right reflects global tobacco demand and price; if tobacco were
fetching a higher price on the global market, for example, the domestic quota market would
respond by bidding up the price of quota rights.
188. This figure is based on author’s own calculations. Supposing that Vp is the present value
of the quota rights, Vl is the value of the yearly lease, and r is the discount rate, then Vp = Vl / (1
– (1 + r)-1). Setting Vl at sixty cents per pound and r at 0.05, Vp = $12.60. This calculation assumes
that the value of the quota right would remain constant over time indefinitely. Of course, prices
fluctuate over time, making this calculation an approximation. The downward-price trend preFETRA might be offset by a future price increase if worldwide supply decreased to more
adequately match demand, or the downward-price trend might be offset by controlling for
uncertainty in the ongoing viability of the domestic quota system. In either case, the simple
present-value calculation might still be a valid method for calculating the compensation due.
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despite the reality that the quota system was politically unstable and
likely to be eliminated by legislation sooner rather than later. Such an
argument fails, however, because the threat of government
elimination of property rights does not render those rights worth less
189
for purposes of takings analysis. Otherwise, Congress could reduce
the amount of compensation that would be “just” simply by
threatening to eliminate a right created by statute. The secondary
market for the right would become depressed, and thus the
compensation due for the ultimate elimination of the right would
similarly decrease.
Importantly, the takings analysis here does not ask whether the
taking of $5.60 per pound (the present value calculation that yielded a
price of $12.60 per pound minus the offered compensation of $7.00
per pound) constitutes a taking requiring just compensation. Such a
calculation would conflate the taking and just compensation inquiries,
190
an analytical approach never embraced by the Court. Instead, a
taking was first found, then the question of what compensation is
191
“just” follows. Thus, the final question in the analysis is whether the
compensation offered by FETRA (56 percent of the value of the
quota rights) is “just.” Because the Court has held that “‘just
compensation’ means the full monetary equivalent of the property
taken” and “[t]he owner is to be put in the same position monetarily
as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken,”192 it is
clear that just compensation requires payment of $12.60 per pound,
which is 100 percent of the value of the property taken.
Therefore, FETRA effects a taking of the quota holders’
property interest in their quota rights and does not provide just
compensation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the passage of FETRA effects a taking of private
property without just compensation in its elimination of the tobacco

189. Cf. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 477–78
(1973) (“The Government must pay just compensation for those interests ‘probably within the
scope of the project from the time the Government was committed to it.’ It may not take
advantage of any depreciation in the property taken that is attributable to the project itself.”
(quoting Miller, 317 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted))).
190. See supra note 69.
191. See supra note 75.
192. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
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quota holders’ property interest, under either the categorical standard
of Lucas or the balancing standard of Mahon. The property interest
in question is properly identified as the exclusive right to produce
tobacco in a certain proportion to the total domestic production
figure chosen by the secretary of agriculture. The Buyout does
include partial compensation for quota holders, in the amount of
$7.00 per pound of tobacco- quota right; this Note, however, contends
that just compensation would be $12.60 per pound. Because a proper
takings analysis calculates just compensation independently of
whether a taking has occurred, the Buyout does not justly
compensate quota holders.
The ramifications of this finding are costly for the government.
Many crops remain heavily regulated. The deregulation of those
markets may create a regulatory taking for which just compensation
must be provided.

